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1 Introduction
Classical social choice studies problems where a xed set of agents have to choose an outcome
from a given set of outcomes, and agents have preferences only over this set. However, there
are settings where, depending on the chosen outcome, some agents might want to leave the
society; and this, in turn, might be perceived by some agents that were initially willing to
remain in the society as negative, and now they might also want to leave. For instance, in the
case of an excludable and costly public good, agentspreferences may depend on the level of
the public good and on the size of the set of agents consuming (and contributing to nance)
it. Also, when membership is voluntary in a double sense: no agent can be forced to belong
to the nal society and any agent can be part of it, if the agent whishes to be. A prototypical
example of this class of problems is a political party, whose membership may depend on the
positions that the party takes on issues like the death penalty, abortion or the possibility of
allowing a region of a country to become independent. A professor in a department may start
looking for a position elsewhere if he considers that the recruitment of the department has not
being satisfactory to his standards; and this, in turn might trigger further exits. To be able
to deal with such situations the classical social choice model has to be modied to include
explicitly the possibility that initial members of the society may leave it as the consequence
of the chosen outcome and hence, preferences have to be extended to order pairs formed by
the nal society and the chosen outcome.
There is a large literature that has already considered explicitly the dependence of the
nal society on the choices made by the initial society.1 Barberà, Maschler and Shalev (2001),
Barberà and Perea (2002), and Berga, Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2004, 2006, 2007)
study alternative models in terms of the voting methods used to choose the outcome and the
timing under which members reconsider their membership. Jackson and Nicolò (2004) study
the provision of excludable public goods when agents care also about the number of other
consumers. In this note (as we also do in the companion paper Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme
(2017)), we look at the general setting without being specic about the two issues. We do that
by considering that the set of alternatives are all pairs formed by a subset of the original society
N (an element in 2N ; the subset of agents that will remain in the society) and an outcome in
1See for instance Roberts (1999) for problems related to club formation and Sobel (2000) for the declining
of standards in societies that choose their members.
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X. Then, we assume that agentspreferences are dened over the set of alternatives 2N X
and satisfy two natural requirements. First, each agent has a strict preference between any two
alternatives, provided he belongs to at least one of the two corresponding societies. Second,
each agent is indi¤erent between any two alternatives, provided he is not a member of any of
the two corresponding societies; namely, agents that do not belong to the nal society do not
care about neither its composition nor the chosen outcome.
We consider rules that operate on this restricted domain of preference proles by selecting,
for each prole, an alternative (a nal society and an outcome). In Bergantiños, Massó, and
Neme (2017) we characterize the class of strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent
rules as the family of all serial dictator rules.2
For applications where the prole is common knowledge (and hence, the strategic revelation
of agents preferences is not an issue) we focus on internally stable and consistent rules.3
Internal stability says that nobody can force an agent to remain in the society if the agent
does not want to do so. This is a minimal requirement of individual rationality, and it is a
desirable property whenever membership is voluntary. A rule is consistent if the following
property holds. Apply the rule to a given prole and consider the new problem where the new
society is formed by the subset of agents chosen at the original prole. A consistent rule has
to choose, at the subprole of preferences of the agents that remain in the society, the same
alternative. Thus, a consistent rule does not have to be reapplied after an alternative has been
chosen. We want to emphasize that, in contrast with the standard notion, our consistency
property requires to re-apply the rule only to the (non-empty) set of agents that has been
selected at the original prole. We think that this is the relevant consistency notion because
the new composition of the society is not just a hypothetical circumstance, it is a fact. Internal
stability and consistency are desirable if we want to interpret the alternative chosen by the
rule as being the nal one, in a double sense. Members of the nal society want to stay and
if the rule would be applied again to the nal society it would choose the same nal society
and the same outcome, so there is no need to do so.
2A rule is outsider independent if it is invariant with respect to the change of the preferences of an agent
who is not a member of the two nal societies.
3For the study of consistent rules in other social choice settings see, for instance, Sasaki and Toda (1992),
Thomson (1994, 2007), Özkal-Sanver (2013), Nizamogullari and Özkal-Sanver (2014, 2015) and Bergantiños,
Massó and Neme (2015).
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We adapt well-known voting methods to our setting with the goal of making them either
internally stable or consistent, or both.4 We show that two prominent scoring methods,
plurality voting and the Borda rule, do not satisfy consistency. However, approval voting not
only satises internal stability and consistency but it also satises e¢ ciency and neutrality.
Finally, we show that the Condorcet winner is internally stable, consistent, e¢ cient, neutral
and anonymous at those proles where an alternative beats all other alternatives by majority
voting (namely, whenever it is a well-dened rule).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. Section 3 contains
the denitions of the properties of rules that we are interested in. Section 4 contains the
analysis of well-known rules from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency
properties. Section 5 has two nal remarks.
2 Preliminaries
This section follows closely Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2017). Let N = f1; : : : ; ng, with
n  2; be the set of agents who have to choose an outcome from a given nite set X of
possible outcomes. We are interested in situations where some agents may not be part of the
nal society, perhaps as the consequence of the chosen outcome. To model such situations,
let A = 2N  X be the set of alternatives and assume that each i 2 N has preferences over
A. Observe that for all x 2 X, (?; x) 2 A; so we are admitting the possibility that the nal
society does not have any member. We will often use the notation a for a generic alternative
(S; x) 2 A; i.e., a  (S; x), a0  (S 0; x0); and so on. Let Ri denote is (weak) preference over
A; where for any pair a; a0 2 A; aRia0 means that i considers a to be at least as good as a0:
Let Pi and Ii denote the strict and indi¤erence relations over A induced by Ri, respectively;
namely, for any pair a; a0 2 A; aPia0 if and only if aRia0 and :a0Ria; and aIia0 if and only
if aRia0 and a0Ria: We assume that each i does not care about any of those alternatives at
which i does not belong to their corresponding nal societies. Besides i is not indi¤erent
between any pair of alternatives at which i belongs to at least one of the two corresponding
nal societies. Namely, we assume that is preferences Ri satisfy the following two properties:
for all S; T 2 2N and x; y 2 X;
4Example 1 shows that without those adaptations, the voting methods are not internally stable.
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(P.1) if i =2 S [ T then (S; x) Ii (T; y) ; and
(P.2) if i 2 S [ T and (S; x) 6= (T; y) then either (S; x)Pi (T; y) or (T; y)Pi (S; x) :
The fact that agentspreferences satisfy (P.1) is the reason why our model cannot mechan-
ically be embedded into the classical model. A specic analysis is required, partly because
properties like internal stability and consistency become specially meaningful under this do-
main restriction. We see property (P.1) as being a natural assumption for our setting, and it
is a critical requirement for our results to hold. Let Ri be the set of preferences of i satisfying
(P.1) and (P.2), and let R = i2NRi be the set of (preference) proles.
We denote the subset of alternatives with the property that i is not a member of the
corresponding nal society by [?]i = f(S; x) 2 A j i =2 Sg. By (P.1), i is indi¤erent among
them; i.e.,
[?]i = fa 2 A j aIi (?; x) for some x 2 Xg :
By (P.1), (?; x)Ii(?; y) for all x; y 2 X and [?]i can be seen as the indi¤erence class generated
by the empty society. Observe that [?]i may be at the top of is preferences. With an abuse
of notation we often treat, when listing a preference ordering, the indi¤erence class [?]i as if
it were an alternative; for instance, given Ri and a 2 A we write aRi[?]i to represent that
aRia
0 for all a0 2 [?]i :
The top of Ri; denoted by  (Ri) ; is the set of all best alternatives according to Ri; namely,
 (Ri) = fa 2 A j aRia0 for all a0 2 Ag :
Note that by (P.1) and (P.2), (Ri) is either a singleton set or the indi¤erence class [?]i:
A rule is a social choice function f : R! A selecting, for each prole R 2 R, an alternative
f(R) 2 A: To be explicit about the two components of the alternative chosen by f at R; we
will often write f (R) as (fN (R) ; fX (R)), where fN (R) 2 2N and fX (R) 2 X:
To clarify the model, we relate it with two of the examples used in the introduction. The set
of agents N corresponds to the initial members of the political party, the set of outcomes X to
the set of choices that the political party has to make and the set S, if the chosen alternative is
(S; x), to the set of nal members of the party that stay after it supports outcome x. Similarly,
N corresponds to the set of professors in the department, the set of outcomes X to all subsets
of candidates and the set S; if the chosen alternative is (S; x); to the set of professors who
remain in the department after the subset of candidates x has been hired.
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3 Properties of rules
In this section we present several properties that a rule may satisfy. The rst two impose
conditions at each prole.
A rule is e¢ cient if it always selects a Pareto optimal allocation.
Efficiency For each R 2 R there is no a 2 A with the property that aRif(R) for all
i 2 N and aPjf(R) for some j 2 N:
The next property is related to the stability of a rule, and it captures the idea that agents
are able to exit a society at their free will. Internal stability says that no agent belonging to
the nal society would prefer to leave it.
Internal stability For all R 2 R and all i 2 fN (R) ; f (R)Pi(fN(R)nfig; fX(R)).
It is immediate to see that internal stability is indeed equivalent to the requirement of
individual rationality (for all agents); i.e., for all R and all i; f(R)Ri[?]i: Individual rationality
implies internal stability by their denitions and (P.2). Assume f is internally stable and let
R be arbitrary. If i 2 fN(R) then f(R)Pi[?]i: If i =2 fN(R) then, by (P.1), f(R)Iia for any
a 2 [?]i: Thus, for all i, f(R)Ri[?]i.5
The next three properties impose conditions by comparing the alternatives chosen by the
rule at two di¤erent proles. A rule is anonymous if the names of the agents are not relevant to
select the alternative. To dene it formally, let  : N ! f1; : : : ; ng be an ordering of N (i.e.,
a one-to-one mapping). Given i 2 N; (i) (or i to simplify notation) is the agent assigned
to i after applying  to N: The set of all orderings  : N ! f1; : : : ; ng will be denoted by
: Given S 2 2N and  2  we denote by (S) the subset of agents associated to S by ;
namely, (S) = fi 2 N j (j) = i for some j 2 Sg: Given R 2 R and  2  we denote by
R the new prole where, for all i 2 N; agent (i) has the preference obtained from Ri after
replacing each (S; x) by ((S); x):
Anonymity For all R 2 R and all  2 , f (R) = ((fN(R)); fX(R)):
A rule is neutral if the names of the outcomes do not play any role in selecting the social
alternative. To dene it formally, let  : X ! X be a permutation of X. Given x 2 X; (x)
5We will later argue (at the beginning of Section 4) that serial dictator rules, as dened in Bergantiños,
Massó and Neme (2017), are not internally stable.
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is the outcome assigned to x after applying  to X: The set of all permutations  : X ! X
will be denoted by : Let Y  X be non-empty and  2 . Denote by (Y ) the subset of
outcomes associated to Y by ; namely, (Y ) = fx 2 X j (y) = x for some y 2 Y g: Given
R 2 R and  2  we denote by R the prole where, for all i 2 N , the preference Ri is
obtained from Ri after replacing each (S; x) by (S; (x)):
Neutrality For all R 2 R and all  2 ; f(R) = (fN(R); (fX(R))):
A rule is consistent if the following requirement holds. Apply the rule to a given prole
and consider the subset of agents that are members of the nal society. Construct the new
subprole of preferences restricted to this new set of chosen agents. Then, the rule does not
require to modify the chosen alternative because if it were applied to the new subprole the
new alternative would coincide with the alternative chosen at the original prole. To dene
the property formally, we rst need additional notation. Given R 2 R and S  N , denote by
RjS = ((RjS)i)i2S the restriction of R to 2SX. Namely, given i 2 S; T [T 0  S and x; y 2 X;
(T; x)
 
RjS

i
(T 0; y) if and only if (T; x)Ri (T 0; y) : Second, we specify how a given rule f can
be applied to a subprole by considering it as it were a family of rules, one for each non-empty
subset of N: Given S 2 2Nnf?g denote by RS the set of subproles RjS = ((RjS)i)i2S. Thus, a
rule f can be identied with the collection ffSgS22Nnf?g of rules where for each S 2 2Nnf?g;
fS : RS ! 2S X: We often omit the superscript S and write f(RjS):
Consistency For all R 2 R; f (R) = f  RjfN (R) whenever fN(R) 6= ?:
In contrast with the standard notion, and as we have already said in the Introduction, our
consistency property requires to re-apply the rule only to the (non-empty) set of agents that
has been selected at the original prole. Hence, our notion is weaker since the choice of the
rule f(R) is re-evaluated only at the prole RjfN (R), instead of at all RjS (for S  N). We
think that this is the relevant consistency notion because the new composition of the society
is not just a hypothetical circumstance, it is a fact. And indeed, the new set of agents might
be willing to reconsider their membership and the chosen outcome; particularly because, in
the choice of the later, preferences of members that are not anymore in the society may have
played a relevant role. Consistency says that the original choice, if re-evaluated by the new
society by means of the same rule, will continue to be chosen.
We say that a rule satises any of the above properties at R if the condition dening the
property holds at R:
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4 Internally stable and consistent rules
In Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2017) we characterize the class of all strategy-proof, unan-
imous and outsider independent rules as the family of serial dictator rules.6 A serial dictator
rule induced by  2  and x 2 X, denoted by f;x; proceeds (in up to n steps) as follows.
Fix a prole R 2 R and look for any alternative (S1; x1) in the best indi¤erence class of agent
1, the rst agent in the ordering induced by : If 1 2 S1; set f;x(R) = (S1; x1). Otherwise,
look for any alternative (S2; x2) in the best indi¤erence class of agent 2; the second agent in
the ordering induced by , only among those classes satisfying the property that 1 =2 S2; If
2 2 S2; set f;x(R) = (S2; x2). Otherwise, proceed similarly until the n th step, if reached,
by looking for any alternative (Sn; xn) in the best indi¤erence class of agent n; the last in
the ordering induced by ; only among those classes satisfying the property that for each
k 2 f1; : : : ; n  1g ; k =2 Sn: If n 2 Sn; set f;x(R) = (Sn; xn). Otherwise, and since no agent
wants to stay in the society whatever element of X is selected, set f;x(R) = (?; x) : So, x
plays the role of the residual outcome only when no agent wants to stay in the society under
any circumstance.
It is obvious to see that any serial dictator rule satises e¢ ciency but fails anonymity
and neutrality. Consider a problem where the top alternative for agent 1 is (N; x) but
(?; x)P2 (N; x) : Since the serial dictator rule selects (N; x) ; it does not satisfy internal sta-
bility. We now see that the serial dictator rule satises consistency. Assume that f;x (R) =
(S; y) : Let i be the rst agent in S according with : Notice that (S; y) is the best alternative
of agent i in
f(T; z) j j =2 T for all j < i and z 2 Xg ;
which coincides with fjS ;x
 
RjS

; where jS is the restriction of  into S.
Here, we consider situations where the strategic manipulation in the preference revelation
game is not an issue and we will look for internally stable and consistent rules. To do so, we
rst ask whether two prominent procedures in classical social choice satisfy them. Recall that
in the classical setting the goal is to select an outcome, from a given set X, taking into account
(partially or fully) the strict preferences of agents over X: The procedures we consider are:
6A rule is unanimous if it always selects an alternative belonging to the set of common best alternatives,
whenever this set is nonempty. A rule is outsider independent if it is invariant with respect to the change of
preferences of an agent who is not a member of the two nal societies.
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1. Approval voting. Each i 2 N votes for a subset Xi of X: For each outcome x 2 X,
compute the number of votes received by x; namely, jfi 2 N j x 2 Xigj : The outcome
with more votes is selected. A tie-breaking rule should be applied whenever two or more
outcomes obtain the largest number of votes. Note that approval voting is not a rule
because is vote Xi is not completely determined by Pi
2. Scoring methods. Each i 2 N strictly ranks all outcomes. Assign to each outcome a
pre-established decreasing number of points depending on its position in is ranking.7
Compute the sum of the points obtained by each outcome. Select the one with more
points. A tie-breaking rule should be applied whenever two or more outcomes obtain
the largest number of points.
We tentatively adapt the two procedures to our setting to deal with the indi¤erences
generated by (P.1) and to dene approval voting as a proper rule.
1. Approval voting. Each i 2 N votes for all a 2 A such that aPi [?]i (if any).
2. Scoring methods. For each i 2 N , assign a pre-established decreasing number of points
to each outcome depending on its position in is ranking but considering [?]i as a single
alternative. For each (S; x) 2 A and each i 2 NnS, assign to (S; x) the score obtained
by [?]i :
Example 1 below shows that none of these extensions satisfy internal stability.
Example 1 Assume n  3 and x x 2 X. Let R 2 R be any prole such that  (R1) = [?]1
and for all i 2 Nn f1g ;  (Ri) = (N; x) and [?]iPi (S; y) for all S 6= N , i 2 S and y 2 X.
Then, each of the adapted procedures chooses (N; x) at R: Nevertheless, (N; x) is not internally
stable because agent 1 prefers to leave the society. 
Since we are interested in identifying rules satisfying internal stability, we modify the
previous methods by considering only votes to alternatives (S; x) that are internally stable for
each i 2 S according to Ri; namely, only alternatives (S; x) with the property that (S; x)Pi [?]i
7The Borda rule is the scoring method when the points are the integers k   1; : : : ; 1; 0 where k is the
number of alternatives. The Plurality rule is the scoring method when one point is assigned to the top-ranked
alternative and zero points are assigned to the other alternatives.
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for each i 2 S can receive votes, not only from i but also from all other agents (we call these
alternatives unanimously internally stable). In approval voting each agent votes, among the
set of alternatives at which he is a member of the society, only for those that are unanimously
internally stable. If no alternative receives a vote the rule selects a particular alternative
(?; x) by a tie-breaking rule that will be described later. In a scoring method we consider
only the rank, given agentspreferences, among the unanimously internally stable alternatives.8
Hence, at the prole of Example 1 each i votes for [?]i and (?; y) is selected according to
some preestablished y: With these modications, they satisfy internal stability by denition.
We now focus on two prominent scoring methods: plurality voting and the Borda rule,
respectively denoted by fP and fB. Our rst result is negative: they do not satisfy consistency
(independent of the rule used to break ties). To see that, consider Example 2 below.
Example 2 Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g and X = fy1; y2; y3; y4; y5g be respectively the set of
agents and outcomes and consider the following prole R 2 R: For each i 2 N; (S; x)Pi [?]i
whenever i 2 S. Observe that for each i 2 N; #f(S; x) j (S; x)Pi[?]ig = 25  5 = 160 is
the number of alternatives that at R each agent i ranks strictly above [?]i. In addition, R is
one among all proles satisfying the following properties, where the rst column indicates the
rank of each of the six preference relations.
Rank R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6
1 (N; y1) (N; y2) (N; y3) (Nn f6g ; y4) (Nn f6g ; y4) (N; y5)
2 (Nn f6g ; y1) (Nn f6g ; y1) (Nn f6g ; y1) (Nn f1g ; y4) (Nn f1g ; y4) (N; y4)
3 (Nn f6g ; y4) (Nn f6g ; y4) (Nn f6g ; y4) (Nn f2g ; y4) (Nn f2g ; y4) (N; y3)
4 (Nn f3g ; y4) (Nn f3g ; y4) (N; y2)
5 (Nn f6g ; y1) (Nn f6g ; y1) (N; y1)
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
159 (Nn f3g ; y4) (N; y1) (N; y2) (N; y3) (N; y5)
160 (N; y2) (N; y3) (N; y1) (N; y5) (Nn f1g ; y4) (Nn f2g ; y4)
161 [?]1 [?]2 [?]3 [?]4 [?]5 [?]6
:
First, plurality voting does not satisfy consistency since fP (R) = (Nn f6g ; y4) but at the
same time fP
 
RjNnf6g

= (Nn f6g ; y1).
8To obtain the vote of an agent we have to use information contained in the full prole, but since we are
not considering the strategic aspect of preference revelation, this is not an issue.
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Second, the Borda rule does not satisfy consistency since fB (R) = (Nn f6g ; y4) but
fB(RjNnf6g) = (Nn f6g ; y1) : To see that, in the Borda rule the rst alternative receives 160
points, the second 159, the third 158 and so on, and each alternative in the class [?]i receives
zero points (since all alternatives in the indi¤erence class [?]i receive zero points). The alter-
natives ranked higher than (Nn f6g ; y1) by some agent in Nnf6g at R are: (N; y1) ; (N; y2) ;
(N; y3), (Nn f6g ; y4) ; (Nn f1g ; y4) ; (Nn f2g ; y4) and (Nn f3g ; y4) : Add to this list the al-
ternatives (Nn f6g ; y1) and (N; y5) and observe that the remaining alternatives receive less
points than (Nn f6g ; y1) : The table below shows the number of points (or an upper bound)
assigned at R by each i 2 N (in the columns) to each alternative in the list and the total
number of points (or an upper bound) they obtain (in the last column).
at R 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
(Nn f6g ; y4) 158 158 158 160 160 0 794
(Nn f6g ; y1) 159 159 159 156 156 0 789
(N; y1) 160 2 1  155  155 156  629
(N; y2) 1 160 2  155  155 157  630
(N; y3)  157 1 160 2  155 158  633
(N; y5)  157  157  157 1 2 160  634
(Nn f1g ; y4) 0  157  157 159 159  155  787
(Nn f2g ; y4)  157 0  157 158 158 1  631
(Nn f3g ; y4) 2  157 0 157 157  155  628
:
Hence, fB (R) = (Nn f6g ; y4) :
Similarly, for each i 2 Nn f6g ; #f(S; x) j (S; x)(PjNnf6g)i[?]ig = 24  5 = 80 is the
number of alternatives that at RjNnf6g each agent i 2 Nn f6g ranks strictly above [?]i; hence,
in the Borda rule the rst alternative receives 80 points, the second 79 and so on. The
only alternative ranked higher than (Nn f6g ; y1) by some agent at RjNnf6g is (Nn f6g ; y4) :
The remaining alternatives receive less points that (Nn f6g ; y1) :The table below shows the
number of points assigned by each i 2 Nnf6g (in the columns) to the two alternatives with
the two highest number of total points received at RjNnf6g:
at RjNnf6g 1 2 3 4 5 Total
(Nn f6g ; y4) 79 79 79 80 80 397
(Nn f6g ; y1) 80 80 80 79 79 398
:
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Hence, fB(RjNnf6g) = (Nn f6g ; y1) : Thus, the Borda rule is not consistent. 
Approval voting satises not only consistency (and internal stability by denition) but also
other desirable properties. Before stating this result we need to specify a tie-breaking rule, to
be used whenever two or more alternatives obtain the highest number of votes. The idea is
simple. Suppose that several alternatives obtain the largest number of votes. We choose the
alternative with coalition S in 2N ranked higher following an specied monotonic and complete
order  over coalitions. Since the order is monotonic, we choose an alternative associated with
a coalition S which is not contained in other coalition T associated with an alternative with
the highest number of votes. If it is unique, we are done. Suppose not, then we still have
several alternatives with the highest number of votes, but now all of them coincide in having
the same coalition S but together with a di¤erent outcome in X: We now choose the agent
i in S ranked higher according to the order . We select, among the alternatives with the
highest number of votes having S as the nal society, the one preferred by agent i: We now
dene this tie-braking rule formally.
Let  be a monotonic and complete order over 2N : Namely, for each pair S; T 2 2N such
that S ( T , TS: Observe that NS for all S 6= N: Denote by fAV; the approval voting rule
induced by  as follows. Let A0 = f(Sk; xk)gKk=1 be the set of alternatives that have received the
largest number of votes according to approval voting at R. If Sk = ? for all k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg,
select (?; y) where y is such that (N; y)Pi(N; z) for all z 6= y and figfjg for all j 6= i.
Assume Sk 6= ? for some k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg. First select the nal society S 2 fS1; :::; SKg ranked
highest by  and consider the subset of alternatives f(Sk0 ; xk0) 2 A0 j Sk0 = Sg : Select again
the agent i 2 S who is ranked highest by  (as a singleton set) and choose nally as fAV;(R)
the alternative most preferred by i among those in the family f(Sk0 ; xk0) 2 A0 j Sk0 = Sg :
Proposition 1 below states that any approval voting fAV; is internally stable, consistent,
and additionally satises other desirable properties.
Proposition 1 Let  be a monotonic and complete order over 2N : Then, the approval
voting fAV; satises internal stability, consistency, e¢ ciency and neutrality. Moreover, in
the subdomain of proles where the tie-breaking rule is not applied, fA; satises anonymity.
Proof Observe that if (S; x) is approved by i; then i 2 S: This fact will be repeatedly used
in the proof.
 Internal stability. By denition, fA; is internally stable.
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 Consistency. Let R 2 R be arbitrary and let fAV; (R) = (S; x) be such that S 6= ?:
The set of agents approving (S; x) at R coincides with the set of agents approving (S; x)
at RjfA;N (R): Hence, f
AV;(RjfA;N (R)) = f
AV; (R) and thus, fAV; is consistent.
 E¢ ciency. Suppose otherwise; namely, there exist R 2 R and (S; x) 2 A such that
(S; x)Rif
AV; (R) for all i 2 N and there exists j 2 N such that (S; x)PjfAV;(R):
Hence, (S; x) 6= fAV; (R) : Assume rst that fAV;N (R) = ?, which implies that fAV; (R)
did not receive any vote and S 6= ?. By (P.2), (S; x)PjfAV; (R) for all j 2 S and
(S; x)Ijf
AV; (R) for all j =2 S: But this means that (S; x) received more votes than
fAV; (R), a contradiction. Assume now that fAV;N (R) 6= ? and let i 2 fAV;N (R) : Since
fAV; satises internal stability, fAV; (R)Pi [?]i : Hence, i 2 S and, by the contradiction
hypothesis and (P.2), (S; x)PifAV; (R). We consider two cases. First, f
AV;
N (R)  S:
Since for each j 2 SnfAV;N (R) ; fAV; (R) 2 [?]j and (S; x)RifAV; (R) for all i, it follows
that (S; x) has received more votes than fAV; (R), a contradiction. Second, fAV;N (R) =
S: Then, fA;V  (R) = (S; y) with y 6= x and all agents in S have approved both, (S; x)
and (S; y). This means that the tie-breaking rule  has been used to select fAV; (R),
implying that there exists i 2 S such that fAV; (R)Pi (S; x) which is a contradiction.
 Neutrality. Let R 2 R and  2 : Observe that the number of agents approving
(S; x) at R coincides with the number of agents approving (S; (x)) at R: We consider
two cases. First, fAV; (R) has been approved at R by more agents than any other
alternative. Hence, (fAV;N (R) ; (f
AV;
X (R))) has been approved at R
 by more agents
than any other alternative, implying that fAV; (R) = fAV; (R) : Second, it is necessary
to apply  to select fAV; (R) : Let f(Sk; xk)gKk=1 be the set of alternatives receiving the
largest number of votes at R. Thus, f(Sk; (xk))gKk=1 is the set of alternatives receiving
the largest number of votes at R. Hence,
fAV;N (R
) = fAV;N (R) : (1)
Now, let i 2 fAV;N (R) be the agent with the highest ranking, among singleton sets,
according to  and let i0 2 fAV;N (R) be the agent with the highest ranking, among
singleton sets, according to . By (1) i0 = i: Thus, fAV;X (R
) = (fAV;X (R)); which
together with (1) implies that fAV; (R) = (fAV;N (R) ; (f
AV;
X (R))):
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 Anonymity on the subdomain of proles where the tie-breaking rule is not applied. Let
R be one of such proles. Then, fAV; (R) has been approved by more agents than any
other alternative: Observe that the number of agents approving any (S; x) at R coincides
with the number of agents approving ((S); x) at R. Thus, ((fAV;N (R)); f
AV;
X (R))
has been approved at R by more agents that any other alternative: Hence, fAV; (R) =
((fAV; (R)); fAV;X (R)); which means that f
AV; satises anonymity at R: 
Remark 1 Proposition 1 also holds with other tie-breaking rules. For instance consider an
order  of the set of agents and assume that agents choose between the set of alternatives
A0 = f(Sk; xk)gKk=1 with the largest number of votes according to approval voting atR following
such order. Namely, if Sk = ? for all k, select (?; y) where y is such that (N; y)P1(N; z) for
all z 6= y. Assume Sk 6= ? for some k. Let (S1; x1) in the best indi¤erence class of agent 1
in A0: If 1 2 S1; set fAV; (R) = (S1; x1). Otherwise, look for any alternative (S2; x2) in the
best indi¤erence class of agent 2 in A00 = f(Sk; xk) 2 A0 : 1 =2 Skg. If 2 2 S2; set fAV; (R).
Otherwise, proceed similarly until the n th step.
We end this note by applying the Condorcet winner to our setting. First, we recall the
denition of the Condorcet winner in the classical setting. Fix a prole P of strict preferences
over X and let x; y 2 X be such that x 6= y: We say that x beats y if the number of agents
preferring x to y is strictly larger than the number of agents preferring y to x: We say that
x is a Condorcet winner at P if there is no y that beats x: There are proles at which no
Condorcet winner exists and others at which there are several Condorcet winners. Thus, the
Condorcet winner is not a rule.
We adapt the notion of a Condorcet winner to our setting as we have already did for the
previous two classes of rules. In order to ensure that the chosen alternative satises internal
stability at R we only consider votes for unanimously internally stable alternatives at R. When
several Condorcet winners exist we apply the tie-breaking (using a monotonic and complete
order ) used to dene approval voting.
We say that a prole R 2 R is resolute if there exists a 2 A such that a beats a0 for
all a0 6= a: Thus, the Condorcet winner selects a at R: Let fC;(R) denote the Condorcet
winner (if any) at R: If R 2 R is resolute, then fC;(R) is independent of  and fC;(R) = 1:
Proposition 2 states that the Condorcet winner at resolute proles satises the same properties
as Approval voting, at such proles.
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Proposition 2 Let R be a resolute prole. Then, fC;(R) satises internal stability, con-
sistency, e¢ ciency, neutrality and anonymity at R.
Proof Fix a resolute prole R and set fC; (R) = (S; x) :We show that fC;(R) satises the
properties at R.
 Internal stability. By denition, fC;(R) satises internal stability at R.
 Consistency. We prove that fC;  RjS = (S; x) by showing that at RjS; (S; x) beats
(T; y) for all (T; y) 6= (S; x) with T  S: Let (T; y) be an alternative with the above
properties. Since (S; x) beats (T; y) at R; the number of agents in N preferring (S; x)
to (T; y) is strictly larger than the number of agents in N preferring (T; y) to (S; x) :
Moreover, each agent in NnS is indi¤erent between (S; x) and (T; y) : Thus the number
of agents in S preferring (S; x) to (T; y) (or (T; y) to (S; x)) coincides with the number
of agents in N preferring (S; x) to (T; y) (or (T; y) to (S; x)): Hence, (S; x) beats (T; y)
at RjS, implying that fC;
 
RjS

= (S; x) :
 E¢ ciency. Suppose otherwise; in particular, there must exist (T; y) such that (T; y)Ri (S; x)
for all i 2 N and (S; x) 6= (T; y) : Let i 2 S: Since (S; x) satises internal stability at R;
(S; x)Pi [?]i. Hence, i 2 T and (T; y)Pi (S; x). Each agent in NnT is indi¤erent between
(S; x) and (T; y) : Thus (T; y) beats (S; x) ; which contradicts that fC; (R) = (S; x).
 Neutrality. Observe that for each (T; y) 6= (S; x) ; (S; (x)) beats (T; (y)) at R: Hence,
fC; (R) = (S; (x)) ; which means that fC; satises neutrality at R:
 Anonymity. Observe that for each (T; y) 6= (S; x) ; ((S); x) beats ((T ); y) at R:
Hence, fC; (R) = ((S); x) ; which means that fC; satises anonymity at R: 
Nevertheless, for non-resolute proles the Condorcet winner, even when it is unique, may
not satisfy consistency. To see that, consider the following example.
Example 3 LetN = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g andX = fy1; y2g be respectively the set of agents and out-
comes and let  be any monotonic and complete order over 2N satisfying f1g  f2g  f3g  f4g  f5g.
Consider any prole R satisfying the following properties, where the rst column indicates the
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rank of each of the ve preference relations.
Rank R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
First (Nn f5g ; y1) (Nn f5g ; y1) (Nn f5g ; y2) (Nn f5g ; y2) (N; y1)
Second (Nn f5g ; y2) (Nn f5g ; y2) (N; y1) (N; y1) [?]5
Third (N; y1) (N; y1) (Nn f5g ; y1) (Nn f5g ; y1)
Fourth [?]1 [?]2 [?]3 [?]4
:
The only internally stable alternatives are (Nn f5g ; y1) ; (Nn f5g ; y2) ; and (N; y1) : At R;
(Nn f5g ; y1) ties with (Nn f5g ; y2) (so they do not beat each other), (Nn f5g ; y2) beats (N; y1)
and (N; y1) beats (Nn f5g ; y1). Therefore, R is not resolute because (Nn f5g ; y2) does not
beat (Nn f5g ; y1) : Since (Nn f5g ; y2) is the unique Condorcet winner (no alternative beats
it), fC; (R) = (Nn f5g ; y2) : To check for consistency of f; consider the subprole RjNnf5g
given by
(RjNnf5g)1 (RjNnf5g)2 (RjNnf5g)3 (RjNnf5g)4
First (Nn f5g ; y1) (Nn f5g ; y1) (Nn f5g ; y2) (Nn f5g ; y2)
Second (Nn f5g ; y2) (Nn f5g ; y2) (Nn f5g ; y1) (Nn f5g ; y1)
Third [?]1 [?]2 [?]3 [?]4
:
At RjNnf5g, (Nn f5g ; y1) ties with (Nn f5g ; y2) and they beat all other alternatives. Hence,
the two are Condorcet winners at RjNnf5g: Thus, applying the tie-breaking rule , and since 1
prefers (Nn f5g ; y1) to (Nn f5g ; y2) ; we have that fC;
 
RjNnf5g

= (Nn f5g ; y1) ; which means
that fC; does not satisfy consistency. 
Using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 1 we can prove that the
scoring methods satisfy e¢ ciency and neutrality in the general domain and anonymity when
no tie breaking rule is used. We now present a table summarizing our main ndings.
Properties Approval Condorcet Scoring Serial Dictator
Internal Stability General domain Resolute General domain
Consistency General domain Resolute General domain
E¢ ciency General domain Resolute General domain General domain
Neutrality General domain Resolute General domain
Anonymity No tie breaking Resolute No tie breaking
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5 Final remarks
Before nishing the paper two remarks related to our domain restriction are in order.
First, our main results do not hold without (P.1) because approval voting and the Con-
dorcet winner are not consistent at proles that do not satisfy (P.1). For instance, consider
the example where N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and X = fx; yg are respectively the set of agents and
outcomes, and let P = (R1; R2; R3; R4; R5) be the following preference prole:
Rank R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
First (f123g ; x) (f123g ; x) (f123g ; y) (f123g ; y) (f123g ; y)
Second (f123g ; y) (f123g ; y) (f123g ; x) (f123g ; x) (f123g ; x)
Third (?; x) (?; x) (?; x) (?; x) (?; x)
:
Let  be arbitrary. Since fA; (R) = (f123g ; y) but fA;  Rjf1;2;3g = (f123g ; x) approval
voting is not consistent and hence Proposition 1 does not hold if agentspreferences do not
satisfy (P.1). Since fC; (R) = (f123g ; y) but fC;  Rjf1;2;3g = (f123g ; x) the Condorcet
winner is not consistent and hence Proposition 2 does not hold if agentspreferences do not
satisfy (P.1).
Second, our domain of preferences satisfying conditions (P.1) and (P.2), yet restrictive,
is still very large. And hence, one may ask about the possible extension of our results to
meaningful subdomains for specic problems. First, for the case of an excludable public good
(in a linearly ordered set X of outcomes) when agents have single-peaked preferences over X
and also care about the size of the set of its users, as in Jackson and Nicolò (2004). Second,
as in Berga, Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2004), where a set of founders of a society are
considering the possibility of admitting new members from a given set of candidates, and
founders preferences on nal societies are separable (or additive). Third, assume agent i has
(S; x) as top-ranked and i 2 S: If i 2 T; then (T; x) should be ranked higher than (Tnfig; x);
that is, (T; x) liessomehow between (S; x) and (Tnfig; x); and since (S; x) is the top-ranked
alternative, agent i should prefer the alternative that is closer to the top. Each of those
preference domains will require a specic analysis of the possibilities of designing individually
rational and consistent rules, together with other desirable properties. However, we leave this
analysis for further research.
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